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“Opening the Door” to Presidential
Press Conferences: A Framework for
the Right of Press Access
Alexandria R. Taylor*
Abstract
Since President Donald Trump took office in 2017, there has
been tension between the White House and the press. While this
tension has been present in prior presidencies, its current
manifestation raises important First Amendment issues. This
Note discusses the limitations of the President to restrict the
press’s right of First Amendment access to presidential press
conferences. After delving into the Supreme Court’s development
and recognition of the press’s right of access and how the lower
courts have interpreted this right, this Note proposes a
framework to analyze the press’s right of access and addresses
the question of when and on what grounds the President can
restrict this right. To illustrate these principles, this Note focuses
on how three events involving President Trump and the press—
the Gaggle Exclusion, the Press Conference Exclusion, and the
Press Pass Suspension—implicate the First Amendment and
applies the suggested framework for analyzing the press’s right
of access to these three events.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .......................................................................... 838
A. Events Involving President Trump and the Press .. 839
1. Incident #1: The Gaggle Exclusion .................... 839
2. Incident #2: The Press Conference Exclusion ... 842
* Candidate for J.D., May 2020, Washington and Lee University School
of Law.

837

838

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 837 (2020)

3. Incident #3: The Press Pass Suspension ........... 843
II. Locating the Press’s Right of Access in the First
Amendment .................................................................... 848
A. Supreme Court Decisions ......................................... 848
B. Lower Court Decisions .............................................. 856
III. Analysis of the Press’s Right of Access ............................ 873
A. When and On What Grounds Can the President
Restrict the Press’s Right of Access?: A Framework
.................................................................................. 873
B. Applying the Framework to the Three Trump–Press
Incidents .................................................................. 876
1. Incident #1: The Gaggle Exclusion .................... 876
2. Incident #2: The Press Conference Exclusion ... 878
3. Incident #3: The Press Pass Suspension ........... 878
IV. Conclusion .......................................................................... 880
A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the
government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter
ourselves.
Grosjean v. American Press Co.
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
I. Introduction
This Note will address the limitations of the President to
restrict the press’s right of First Amendment access to
presidential press conferences. Part I will describe how three
events involving President Donald Trump and the press
implicate the First Amendment. Part II will track the Supreme
Court’s development and recognition of the press’s right of
access and will explore how lower courts have navigated this
right. Part III will provide a framework to analyze the press’s
right of access and will address the question of when and on
what grounds the President can restrict this right. Part IV will
present a framework for analyzing whether President Trump
and his Administration have restrained the press’s right of
access in violation of the First Amendment, applying it to the
three aforementioned incidents.
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A. Events Involving President Trump and the Press
Since President Trump took office in 2017, there has been
tension between the White House and the press—and it
continues to escalate. While this tension has existed in prior
presidencies, its current manifestation raises important First
Amendment issues. Three events, described below, illustrate
how President Trump and his Administration have restrained
the press’s right of access and in doing so arguably violated the
First Amendment.
1. Incident #1: The Gaggle Exclusion
The first instance, occurring on February 24, 2017, involved
journalists from several media outlets who were barred from
attending a spontaneous press briefing with the Press Secretary
at the White House.1 That day, reporters did not “expect the
usual and more formal on-camera daily briefing from White
House Press Secretary . . . but did expect a more spontaneous
‘gaggle’ with the White House’s main spokesperson at some
point” that afternoon.2 At noon, however, the White House
updated the reporters, saying “that the gaggle would be
off-camera with an ‘expanded pool.’”3 While some media
outlets—including NBC News, CBS, ABC, FOX, the Washington
Times and the Wall Street Journal—were allowed to attend the
off-camera briefing, other news organizations—such as CNN,
the New York Times, The Hill, BuzzFeed and Politico—were
not.4 Some reporters, including those from The Associated Press
1. See Ali Vitali, White House Excludes Several Outlets from Press
Gaggle, NBC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2017, 2:40 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/politics/white-house/white-house-excludes-several-outlets-press-gagglen725366 (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (noting that a spontaneous press briefing
at the White House is called a “gaggle”) [https://perma.cc/ZW7E-8EZJ].
2. Id.
3. See id. (defining “pool” as a group of journalists who are chosen with
the intention that “the material would be shared with all media colleagues
regardless of who was physically present”).
4. See id. (noting that the Press Secretary characterized this exclusion
by saying, “[W]e had a pool and then we expanded it. We added some folks to
come cover it”).
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and Time magazine, decided to boycott the briefing in light of
the exclusion of the other reporters.5 Hours before the briefing,
President Trump denounced the press, calling it “the enemy of
the American people” during his speech to the annual
Conservative Political Action Conference.6 Trump’s remarks
and the White House’s actions were preceded by a CNN report
the day before “that a White House official had asked the F.B.I.
to rebut a New York Times article . . . detailing contacts
between Mr. Trump’s associates and Russian intelligence
officials.”7
Much of the media, including a few media outlets that were
in attendance at the February 24, 2017 briefing, and media
advocacy groups spoke out against the exclusion of the reporters
from the briefing and labeled the exclusion as “unprecedented”8
and as “a notable break from protocol.”9 While the White House
occasionally holds briefings with smaller groups of reporters,
the difference in this case was that the White House was
“cherry-pick[ing] which media outlets can participate in what
would have otherwise been the press secretary’s televised daily

5. See id. (explaining that a few media outlets decided to not partake in
the “expanded pool” after some media outlets of note were excluded).
6. See id. (noting that President Trump called the press “the enemy of
the American People” because of his dismay toward the press using
anonymous sources).
7. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael M. Grynbaum, Trump Intensifies
His Attacks on Journalists and Condemns F.B.I ‘Leakers,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/us/politics/white-house-seanspicer-briefing.html?module=inline (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/C5VY-5E45].
8. See Dylan Byers et al., White House Blocks News Organizations from
Press Briefing, CNN BUS. (Feb. 24, 2017, 7:23 PM), https://money.cnn.com
/2017/02/24/media/cnn-blocked-white-house-gaggle/index.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2019) (“The decision struck veteran White House journalists as
unprecedented in the modern era . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/CTV7-33KY].
9. See Hadas Gold, White House Selectively Blocks Media Outlets from
Briefing with Spicer, POLITICO (Feb. 24, 2017, 2:31 PM), https://
www.politico.com/story/2017/02/reporters-blocked-white-house-gaggle235360 (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (explaining that “the shift—a notable break
in protocol” was the abrupt change from an on-camera gaggle to a restricted
off-camera gaggle) [https://perma.cc/26HH-QQ8V].
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briefing.”10 The White House Correspondents’ Association
(WHCA), which has represented the interests of members of the
press who cover the White House since 1914, sent out a
statement: “The WHCA board is protesting strongly against
how today’s gaggle is being handled by the White House. We
encourage the organizations that were allowed in to share the
material with others in the press corps who were not. The board
will be discussing this further with White House staff.”11

10. See Sabrina Siddiqui, Trump Press Ban: BBC, CNN and Guardian
Denied Access to Briefing, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2017, 12:49 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/24/media-blocked-white-housebriefing-sean-spicer (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (explaining that these
particular briefings during the Trump Administration have become
“indispensable . . . for journalists trying to interpret the [Administration’s]
often contradictory statements . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/HFX3-SK6N]. A
reporter from CNN, whom the White House excluded, explained the break in
protocol:
We lined up. We were told there was a list ahead of time, which is
sort of abnormal, but we put our name on a list. And then when we
went to enter, I was blocked by a White House staffer, who said we
were not on the list for this gaggle today. Now, normally, if you were
going to do something like this—an extended gaggle, off camera—
you would have one person from each news outlet . . . . [W]e have
multiple people from CNN here every day. So, if you’re going to do
something beyond a pool, which is sort of the smallest group of
reporters that then disseminates the information, you would have
one person from every news outlet. That is not what the White
House was doing today. What the White House was doing was
handpicking the outlets they wanted in for this briefing.
So . . . news outlets that maybe the White House feels are more
favorable were all allowed in, whereas I [and other reporters
were] . . . blocked from entering.
Callum Borchers, White House Blocks CNN, New York Times from Press
Briefing Hours After Trump Slams Media, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017, 4:10
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/24/whitehouse-blocks-cnn-new-york-times-from-press-briefing-hours-after-trumpslams-media/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) (quoting CNN Political
Correspondent Sara) [https://perma.cc/2NJQ-RWPS].
11. White House Correspondents’ Ass’n Board, Statement (Feb. 24,
2017), https://www.whca.press/2017/02/24/february-24-2017-statement/ (last
visited Feb. 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/48GM-CWD8].
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2. Incident #2: The Press Conference Exclusion
The second instance, occurring on July 25, 2018, involved
the White House banning a “CNN reporter from attending a[n]
[open] press event with President Donald Trump . . . after she
asked him questions about his former lawyer Michael Cohen
and Russian President Vladimir Putin” during an earlier photo
op at the White House.12 While President Trump sat for
pictures, the reporter asked questions about these individuals
at a time that it was “typical . . . [to] attempt to ask the
president questions.”13 After the CNN reporter asked her
questions, members of the Trump Administration informed her
that her questions were “inappropriate,” accusing her of
shouting questions and refusing to leave despite repeatedly
being asked to do so, and as a result, “she would not [later] be
allowed to attend an open press event in the White House Rose
Garden.”14 The president of FOX News, among other media
outlets and reporters, issued a statement stating, “We stand in
strong solidarity with CNN for the right to full access for our
journalists as part of a free and unfettered press.”15 The WHCA
also issued a statement:
We strongly condemn the White House’s misguided and
inappropriate decision today to bar one of our members from
an open press event after she asked questions they did not
like. This type of retaliation is wholly inappropriate,
wrong-headed, and weak. It cannot stand. Reporters asking
12. Phil McLausand, White House Bans CNN Reporter from Rose Garden
Event After She Peppers Trump with Tough Questions on Russia, Cohen, NBC
NEWS (July 25, 2018, 8:13 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house
/white-house-bans-cnn-reporter-rose-garden-event-after-she-n894686
(last
visited Feb. 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7X9A-RKZ9].
13. See id. (explaining that this reporter was serving as the “pool
reporter” during the Oval Office photo op, “meaning she was asking questions
on behalf of several news organizations”).
14. See id. (explaining that the reporter was addressed immediately after
the questions, and then later the Press Secretary issued a statement).
15. Matt Richardson, CNN Correspondent Blocked from White House
Press Event, FOX NEWS (July 25, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/cnncorrespondent-blocked-from-white-house-press-event (last visited Feb. 7,
2020) [https://perma.cc/Y75L-5K4P].
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questions of powerful government officials, up to and
including the President, helps hold those people accountable.
In our republic, the WHCA supports the prerogative of all
reporters to do their jobs without fear of reprisal from the
government.16

3. Incident #3: The Press Pass Suspension
The third instance, occurring on November 7, 2018,
involved the White House suspending the press pass of CNN’s
chief White House correspondent, Jim Acosta, after an incident
at a White House press conference.17 As a result, CNN filed suit
against President Trump and several of his aides.18 The suit
asserted that the press pass revocation violated Acosta’s First
and Fifth Amendment rights.19 During the White House press
conference, Acosta had asked the President about immigration
issues and about possible indictments involving Russia’s
interference in the 2016 election.20 A White House intern
reached across Acosta “to take the microphone from him.”21
16. Olivier Knox, President, White House Correspondents’ Ass’n,
Statement from WHCA President Oliver Knox (July 25, 2018), https://
www.whca.press/2018/07/25/statement-from-whca-president-olivier-knox/
(last visited Feb. 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/P37W-B4TX].
17. See Brian Stelter, CNN Sues President Trump and Top White House
Aids for Barring Jim Acosta, CNN BUS. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.cnn.com
/2018/11/13/media/cnn-sues-trump/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2020)
(noting that the CNN reporter Jim Acosta and CNN are “seeking a
preliminary injunction . . . and a ruling from the court preventing the White
House from revoking Acosta’s pass in the future”) [https://perma.cc/E4CYHXHK].
18. See generally Complaint, Cable News Network, Inc. v. Trump, No.
1:18-cv-02610 (D.C.C. Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter CNN v. Trump Complaint].
19. See id. at 14–15 (alleging violations of First and Fifth Amendment
rights).
20. See Merrit Kennedy & David Folkenflik, CNN Sues Trump
Administration To Restore Jim Acosta’s Press Credentials, NPR (Nov. 13,
2018, 3:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/13/667425530/cnn-sues-trumpadministration-over-jim-acostas-press-credentials (last visited Feb. 7, 2020)
(noting specifically that “Acosta asked the president about his
characterization of a migrant ‘caravan’ moving through Mexico as an ‘invasion’
and about possible indictments in the Russian investigation”) [https://
perma.cc/HD73-DVH3].
21. Id.
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Acosta responded, “‘Pardon me, ma’am,’ and did not release the
microphone.”22 He then “asked a followup [sic] question, then
gave up the mic.”23 During the exchange, President Trump
called Acosta a “rude, terrible person” and said, “‘[w]hen you
report fake news, which CNN does, a lot, you are the enemy of
the people.’”24 After the incident, the White House initially
characterized the interaction by saying Acosta had “plac[ed] his
hands on a young woman trying to do her job as a White House
intern.”25 The Press Secretary “tweeted a link to a video to back
up her claim that Acosta physically fended off” the intern.26 This
video was soon discredited by multiple media outlets, finding
that the video had been altered to support the White House’s
version.27 Later, the Press Secretary justified the revocation of
Acosta’s press credentials, issuing a statement characterizing
his actions as inappropriate and unprofessional:
CNN, who has nearly 50 additional hard pass holders,28 and
Mr. Acosta is no more or less special than any other media
outlet or reporter with respect to the First Amendment. . . .
The White House cannot run an orderly and fair press
conference when a reporter acts this way, which is neither
appropriate nor professional. The First Amendment is not
served when a single reporter, of more than 150 present,
attempts to monopolize the floor. If there is no check on this
type of behavior it impedes the ability of the President, the

22. Id.
23. Stelter, supra note 17.
24. CNN v. Trump Complaint, supra note 18, at 10.
25. See Kennedy & Folkenflik, supra note 20 (“Initially, when the White
House said it was suspending Acosta’s credential, it said it would ‘never
tolerate a reporter placing his hands on a young woman just trying to do her
job as a White House intern.’”).
26. Id.
27. See id. (noting that White House counselor Kellyanne Conway later
“denied that the video had been altered but then said it had been ‘sped up’ and
that ‘they do it all the time in sports to see if there’s actually a first down or a
touchdown’”).
28. See, e.g., CNN v. Trump Complaint, supra note 18, at 2 (explaining a
“hard pass” allows a reporter “regular and unescorted access to the White
House and White House briefings”).
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White House staff, and members of the media to conduct
business.29

After the incident, the President said that Acosta “was not
nice to the young woman,” but “I don’t hold him for that because
it wasn’t overly, you know, horrible.”30 The President also told
other reporters, “You have to treat the White House with
respect. You have to treat the presidency with respect.”31 In the
same breath, he suggested that there “could be others” who
might lose their credentials.32
In his complaint, Acosta claimed that the Trump
Administration’s “decision to revoke Acosta’s press credentials
violates the First Amendment” because “Acosta’s questions to
President Trump during that conference are and were all
protected activities under the First Amendment,” and the
Administration deprived him of the “right to access the White
House grounds by revoking [his] White House credentials.”33
The complaint characterized the Trump Administration’s
changing justifications for denying Acosta press credentials as
“hollow” and insufficient to justify “impeding [Acosta’s] First
Amendment rights.”34 The complaint further contended that
revocation of Acosta’s press access right was “a form of
content- and viewpoint-based discrimination and in retaliation
for Plaintiffs’ exercise of protected First Amendment activity”

29. Brian Stelter, Sarah Sanders Responds to the CNN Suit, CNN BUS.
(Nov. 13, 2018, 11:27 AM), https://www.cnn.com/business/live-news/cnn-suestrump-acosta-reaction/h_60ac92e98a6edf377df982c9ecd131ad (last visited
Feb. 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/T447-MAVH].
30. Stelter, supra note 17.
31. See David Bauder & Jonathan Lemire, Trump Claims Video
Distributed by White House Wasn’t Altered, AP NEWS (Nov. 9, 2018), https://
www.apnews.com/8c4b1b634fe64ebba75bbf98edf9db4f (last visited Feb. 7,
2020) (noting that during this same exchange, Trump said that Acosta is a
“very unprofessional guy. I don’t think he’s a smart person but he has a loud
voice”) [https://perma.cc/CM5N-Z8AN?type=image].
32. See id. (noting that President Trump had not decided if Acosta’s pass
would be reinstated).
33. CNN v. Trump Complaint, supra note 18, at 14.
34. Id. at 15.
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motivated by a dislike of CNN’s and Acosta’s “coverage of the
administration and critique of the President.”35
In reaction to the revocation of the reporter’s press pass, the
WHCA released a statement in support of CNN:
[WHCA] strongly supports CNN’s goal of seeing their
correspondent regain a U.S. Secret Service security
credential that the White House should not have taken away
in the first place. Revoking access to the White House
complex amounted to disproportionate reaction to the events
of last Wednesday. We continue to urge the Administration
to reverse course and fully reinstate CNN’s correspondent.
The President of the United States should not be in the
business of arbitrarily picking the men and women who cover
him.36

The presiding federal district court judge ultimately
granted CNN’s and Acosta’s request for a temporary restraining
order and ordered the Administration to restore Acosta’s
credentials.37 The judge did so on the ground that the
Administration violated Acosta’s Fifth Amendment right by
depriving him of “a fair and transparent process.”38 The judge
did not make any determinations based on the First
Amendment claim.39 CNN dropped its lawsuit after the White

35. Id.
36. Olivier Knox, President, White House Correspondents’ Ass’n,
Statement by WHCA President Olivier Knox on CNN Lawsuit Against White
House (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.whca.press/2018/11/13/statement-bywhca-president-olivier-knox-on-cnn-lawsuit-against-white-house/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5TE5-YP8J].
37. See Michael M. Grynbaum & Emily Baumgaertner, CNN’s Jim
Acosta Returns to the White House After Judge’s Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/business/media/cnn-acostatrump.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) (noting that the judge “hand[ed] the
cable network [CNN] an early win in its lawsuit against the president and
members of his administration”) [https://perma.cc/DJT3-HSET].
38. See id. (noting that the judge stated from the bench that “the
administration’s process for barring the correspondent ‘is still so shrouded in
mystery that the government could not tell me’ who made the decision”).
39. See id. (noting that the judge said, “I want to emphasize the very
limited nature of this ruling . . . . I have not determined that the First
Amendment was violated here”).
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House fully restored Acosta’s press pass.40 In the same breath,
the White House issued a set of rules that “reporters may only
ask ‘a single question’ at a press conference, and “[f]ollow-up
questions will only be permitted ‘at the discretion of the
President or other White House officials.’”41 Further, “reporters
must ‘physically surrender’ the microphone, when directed.”42
In response, the WHCA issued a statement noting its
disapproval of the White House’s new rules:
The White House Correspondents’ Association had no role in
crafting any procedures for future press conferences. For as
long as there have been White House press conferences,
White House reporters have asked follow-up questions. We
fully expect this tradition will continue. We will continue to
make the case that a free and independent news media plays
a vital role in the health of our republic.43

As noted, the judge hearing CNN’s and Acosta’s First
Amendment challenge did not reach that issue and provide a
legal analysis of the right asserted. This Note will do so.

40. See Brian Stelter & David Shortell, White House Backs Down from
Legal Fight, Restores Jim Acosta’s Press Pass, CNN BUS. (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/19/media/cnn-acosta-emergency-hearing
/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) (issuing a statement in which CNN said,
“Today the White House fully restored Jim Acosta’s press pass. As a result,
our lawsuit is no longer necessary . . . . We look forward to continuing to cover
the White House”) [https://perma.cc/3HJU-ZAEU].
41. See id. (“[W]e have made a final determination in this process: [Y]our
hard pass is restored. Should you refuse to follow these rules in the future, we
will take action in accordance with the rules set forth above.”).
42. Id.
43. Olivier Knox, President, White House Correspondents’ Ass’n, WHCA
Statement on Restoration of Press Pass (Nov. 19, 2018), https://
www.whca.press/2018/11/19/whca-statement-on-restoration-of-press-pass/
(last visited Mar. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/C247-F6DG].
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II. Locating the Press’s Right of Access in the First Amendment
A. Supreme Court Decisions
The First Amendment, among other things, guarantees the
rights to freedom of speech and press.44 The Supreme Court has
held that the government has a heavy burden to justify a direct
or indirect burden on First Amendment rights: it must
“convincingly show a substantial relation between the
information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling
state interest.”45
The Supreme Court began to develop a right of First
Amendment access in the 1930s when it found that a labor
union could not be denied the right of access to a public building
based on an ordinance that would allow the arbitrary
suppression of speech and association.46 Prior to 1974, the issue
of access to public property was addressed in a number of
Supreme Court cases not involving the press.47
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”).
45. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546
(1963); accord, Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982) (“[T]he First
Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by
not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the
restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected
expression.”); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“The
decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power
to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.”); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (“Where there is a significant
encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing
a subordinating interest which is compelling.”).
46. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (“[The
ordinance] enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere
opinion that such refusal will prevent ‘riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage.’ It can thus be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of
free expression of views . . . .”). The Supreme Court had set the groundwork
for Hague the year before when it first held that the government could not
impose arbitrary restrictions on the right to circulate religious literature on
public streets in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
47. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 828 (1976) (stating that
antiwar demonstrators had no First Amendment right of access to a military
base for political activity); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 169–70 (1972)
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In Pell v. Procunier,48 the Supreme Court first addressed
the press’s right of access to public property.49 In that case the
Court found that a prison policy did not violate journalists’ First
Amendment rights when it disallowed the journalists to have
face-to-face interviews with inmates.50 The Court noted that
while “[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments bar government
from interfering in any way with a free press, . . . [t]he
Constitution does not . . . require government to accord the
press special access to information not shared by members of
the public generally,” nor does it have an affirmative duty to do
so.51 Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the importance of a free
press and its significance in creating a connector between the
general public and its government:
The constitutional guarantee of a free press assures the
maintenance of our political system and an open society, and
(explaining that an antiwar organization could not be denied access to campus
facilities because of unpopular views); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 92 (1972) (discussing a public body could not ban political picketing but
allow labor picketing near schools); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617
(1968) (stating civil marchers could be banned from courthouse property,
where their presence interfered with the rights of others to access the
building); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (explaining that civil
rights demonstrations could be banned from county jail, a public area not
traditionally opened to public access); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143
(1966) (asserting that civil rights demonstrators could not be banned from
public library based on racial discrimination); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
544–45 (1965) (explaining that civil rights marchers could not be banned from
courthouse grounds under statute that gave unfettered discretion to police);
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (asserting that black
demonstrators could not be banned from state house grounds for expressing
unpopular views).
48. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827–28 (1974) (holding that the
press may be denied prisoner visitation in a manner consistent with a bar to
public access generally).
49. See id. at 830–31 (introducing an analysis of the First Amendment
claims of plaintiffs under an access to government property framework).
50. See id. at 819 (“The plaintiffs brought the suit to challenge the
constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, . . . of the
California Department of Corrections Manual, which provides that ‘press and
other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be
permitted.’”).
51. Id. at 834.
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secures the paramount public interest in a free flow of
information to the people concerning public officials . . . .
Correlatively, the First and Fourteenth Amendments also
protect the right of the public to receive such information and
ideas as are published.52

On the same day as the Pell ruling, the Court similarly held
in Saxbe v. Washington Post53 that a prison policy prohibiting
face-to-face interviews with individual inmates did not violate
the reporter’s First Amendment rights.54 The policy was merely
“a variation of the burden on all individuals, press or not, to
allow no one to enter the prison and to speak with whomever he
or she would like.”55 In Justice Powell’s dissent, he expressed
concern about the idea “that no governmental inhibition of press
access to newsworthy information warrants constitutional
scrutiny,”56 stating:
It goes too far to suggest that the government must justify
under the stringent standards of First Amendment review
every regulation that might affect in some tangential way
the availability of information to the news media . . . . [But]
[a]t some point official restraints on access to news
sources . . . may so undermine the function of the First
Amendment that it is both appropriate and necessary to
require the government to justify such regulations in terms
more compelling than discretionary authority and
administrative convenience.57

52. Id. at 832.
53. See Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (holding a District
of Columbia policy banning face-to-face interviews did not violate the First
Amendment’s freedom of the press provision). The Court noted that Saxbe was
“constitutionally indistinguishable” from Pell. Id.
54. See id. at 850 (“[S]ince Policy Statement 1220.1A ‘does not deny the
press access to sources of information available to members of the general
public,’ we hold that it does not abridge the freedom that the First Amendment
guarantees.” (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 835)).
55. Ilana Friedman, Note, Where Public and Private Spaces Converge:
Discriminatory Media Access to Government Information, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
253, 264 (2006) (citing Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849).
56. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
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Based on similar facts in Pell and Saxbe, the Supreme Court
in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.58 held that “[t]he news media have
no constitutional right of access to a county jail, over and above
that of other persons, to interview inmates . . . for publication
and broadcasting.”59 Still, within limitations, the Court
recognized the importance of the media’s role to inform the
public:
Beyond question, the role of the media is important; acting
as the “eyes and ears” of the public, they can be a powerful
and constructive force, contributing to remedial action in the
conduct of public business. They have served that function
since the beginning of the Republic, but like all other
components of our society media representatives are subject
to limits.60

The Houchins Court also recognized “the role of the media
‘as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental
officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping
officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom
they were selected to serve.’”61
Two years later, the Supreme Court held that the press had
a right of access to criminal trials under the First Amendment
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.62 The Court located
“[t]he right of access to places traditionally open to the public”
in “the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech
and press,” in addition to the right of assembly.63 The Supreme
Court considered the policy implications if it were to not
recognize the right of access in the case of a criminal trial,
58. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 2 (1978) (holding the media
has no special right of access to penal institutions).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id. at 10 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)).
62. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (holding the First Amendment guarantees a right of public
access to criminal trials).
63. See id. at 577–78 (“A trial courtroom also is a public place where the
people generally—and representatives of the media have a right to be present,
and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the
integrity and quality of what takes place.”).
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stating that “[t]he explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to
publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much
meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be
foreclosed arbitrarily.”64 The Court added that “[f]ree speech
carries with it some freedom to listen.”65 Further, the Court
viewed the media as a conduit between the public and criminal
proceedings.66 Because the press often holds special privileges,
such as “special seating and priority of entry,” the press was in
the best position to deliver information about a proceeding to
the greater public who is unable to observe a trial firsthand.67
In turn, this symbiotic relationship “contribute[s] to public
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the
functioning of the entire criminal justice system.”68 Thus, the
Court held that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in
the guarantees of the First Amendment,” because “[w]ithout the
freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of the
press could be eviscerated.’”69
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion predicated a
right of press access to attend criminal trials under two
conditions: 1) whether there is an “enduring and vital tradition”
of public access to the forum, and 2) “whether access to a
particular government process is important in terms of that
very process.”70

64. Id. at 576–77.
65. Id. at 576.
66. See id. at 572–73 (noting that the media functions “as surrogates for
the public”).
67. See id. at 573 (“While media representatives enjoy the same right of
access as the public, they often are provided special seating and priority of
entry so that they may report what people in attendance have seen and
heard.”).
68. Id. (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
69. Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
70. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,71 the Supreme
Court extended the access rule and held a Massachusetts state
law which required judges at trials for sexual offenses against
minors to exclude the press and general public from the
courtroom during the victim’s testimony unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.72 The Court applied the Richmond
Newspapers test—referring to each prong, respectively, as
“experience” and “logic”73—to explain why a right of access
under the First Amendment applies to criminal trials:74
First, the criminal trial historically has been open to the
press and general public . . . . This uniform rule of openness
has been viewed as significant in constitutional terms not
only because the Constitution carries the gloss of history, but
also because a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable
judgment of experience . . . . Second, the right of access to
criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the
functioning of the judicial process and the government as a
whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the
quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding
process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as
a whole. Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters
an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public
respect for the judicial process. And in the broadest terms,
public access to criminal trials permits the public to
participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial
process—an essential component in our structure of
self-government.75

71. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982)
(holding a mandatory-closure rule for state courts violates the First
Amendment).
72. See id. at 602 (“[T]he mandatory-closure rule contained in § 16A [of
Chapter 278 of the Massachusetts General Laws] violates the First
Amendment.”).
73. See id. at 606 (“[T]he institutional value of the open criminal trial is
recognized in both logic and experience.”).
74. See id. at 605 (“Two features of the criminal justice system,
emphasized in the various opinions in Richmond Newspapers, together serve
to explain why a right of access to criminal trials in particular is properly
afforded protection by the First Amendment.”)
75. Id. at 605–06.
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The Court recognized that the government can only
overcome the right of access to criminal trials if it can show “that
the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”76
Although the Court acknowledged the government’s interests
were compelling—to protect sexual abuse victims and to
encourage them to come forward with their claims—the means
by which the state achieved these interests—imposing a
mandatory closure rule—were not narrowly tailored.77 The
Court stated that “circumstances under which the press and
public can be barred from a criminal trial are limited,”78
reiterating the criminal trial’s presumption of openness as
recognized in Richmond Newspapers.79
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise
I),80 the Supreme Court applied both the two-pronged test from
Richmond Newspapers and the compelling interest standard
from Globe Newspaper to determine whether the right of access
in criminal trials could extend to voir dire examination of
potential jurors.81 First, under the Richmond Newspapers test,
the Court concluded that that there is a right of access to the
jury selection process because jury selection has historically
been an open process and, as such, “gives assurance that
established procedures are being followed and that deviations

76. Id. at 607.
77. See id. at 607–10 (“But as compelling as that interest is, it does not
justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that the circumstances of the
particular case may affect the significance of the interest.”).
78. Id. at 606.
79. See id. at 605, 610, 619 (referring to Richmond Newspapers’
acknowledgement that criminal trials have historically been presumptively
open).
80. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501,
505 (1984) (holding the selection of jurors to be a public process under First
Amendment access principles).
81. See Amy Jordan, The Right of Access: Is There a Better Fit than the
First Amendment?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1355 (2004) (“In Press-Enterprise I,
the Court for the first time used the dual considerations of Richmond
Newspapers and Globe to assess the press’s right of access to proceedings other
than criminal trials.” (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 503)).
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will become known.”82 Second, under the Globe Newspaper test,
the Court concluded that, although the “jury selection process
may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of
a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply
personal matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping
out of the public domain,” the trial judge’s “broad order denying
access to information at the voir dire” was not narrowly tailored,
because he could have limited the information to what “was
actually sensitive and deserving of privacy protection.”83
Two years later, the Supreme Court continued to distill
Justice Brennan’s two principles from Richmond Newspapers in
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II),84
referring to them as the “tests of experience and logic” to
determine “whether a qualified First Amendment right of public
access attaches” to preliminary hearings.85 The “experience” test
required considering “whether the place and process have
historically been open to the press and general public.”86 The
“logic” test required considering “whether public access plays a
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular
process in question.”87 Based on these tests, the Court held that
a constitutional right of access applied to preliminary
hearings.88 The “logic and experience” test “has become the
82. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508 (“Openness thus enhances
both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so
essential to public confidence in the system.” (citing Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 569–71)).
83. Id. at 511–13.
84. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S.
1, 10 (1986) (holding the First Amendment right of access of criminal trials
applies to preliminary hearings).
85. See id. at 10 (concluding that a qualified First Amendment right of
access to criminal proceedings attaches to California preliminary hearings);
see also Jordan, supra note 81, at 1357 (explaining that the right is qualified
because “it can be overcome if the government can withstand the strict
scrutiny standard of Globe”).
86. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8 (distilling the “experience”
prong from the consideration that a “tradition of accessibility implies the
favorable judgment of experiences”).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 10 (“The considerations that led the Court to apply the First
Amendment
right
of
access
to
criminal
trials
in Richmond
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framework for determining whether the public has a right of
access to other aspects of judicial proceedings,” but courts have
expanded its application, revealing “a general agreement among
the courts that the public’s right of access attaches to decisions
‘of major importance to the administration of justice.’”89
A default rule to be derived from the Supreme Court access
cases is that once the government has “opened its door” to public
access, the Constitution assures the public and the press
access.90 Moreover, under the logic of the access cases, once
government “opens the door” allowing press access, members of
the press cannot be arbitrarily excluded based on viewpoint
considerations.91
B. Lower Court Decisions
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided the extent
to which governmental bodies under the First Amendment can
exclude members of the press from press conferences. In 1972,
in deciding Lewis v. Baxley,92 an Alabama district court held
that “there is a limited First Amendment right of access
to . . . the press rooms, and the press conferences dealing with

Newspapers and Globe Newspaper and the selection of jurors in PressEnterprise I lead us to conclude that the right of access applies to preliminary
hearings as conducted in California.”).
89. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 1986)
(noting courts’ recognitions of a public right of access to voir dire in a criminal
trial, criminal pretrial hearings, and civil cases, for instance) (quoting In re
Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1984)).
90. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) (Steward, J.,
concurring) (“The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the
public a right of access to information generated or controlled by
government . . . . The Constitution does no more than assure the public and
the press equal access once government has opened its doors.”).
91. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Media, 120 HARV. L. REV.
990, 1019–20 (2007) (“[J]ournalists cannot be arbitrarily excluded from press
forums to which other journalists have access in retaliation for previously
expressed viewpoints.”).
92. See Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (holding
the press has a limited First Amendment right of access to state government
news).
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state government.”93 The court held that this right is “limited”
to “access to places that other members of the press may go and
congregate in the ordinary course of events,” but that all
reporters do not have a constitutional right to an individual
interview just because another reporter was granted that
access.94 The court emphasized that “[t]he right of access is a
limited right to reasonable access.”95
Several years later, a Hawaii district court applied the
Lewis v. Baxley holding to another instance of press access.96
The Hawaiian court concluded that a mayor could not deny a
reporter access to a general news conference held in the mayor’s
office because “other news reporters attend[ed] press
conferences” in the mayor’s office.97 The district court explained:
If he chooses to hold a general news conference in his inner
office, for that purpose and to that extent his inner office
becomes a public gathering place. When he uses public
buildings and public employees to call and hold general news
conferences on public matters he is operating in the public
and not the private sector of his activities.98

The mayor had “opened the door” to the reporters’ right of
access to his office after he had made his office available to
members of the press generally.99 Thus, the mayor could not
prevent the plaintiff, an individual reporter, from attending the

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 908–09 (D. Haw. 1974) (“The
First Amendment freedom of the press includes a limited right of reasonable
access to news . . . . This right of access includes a right of access to the public
galleries, the press rooms, and the press conferences dealing with
government.” (citing Lewis, 368 F. Supp. at 777)).
97. Id. at 911.
98. Id. at 910.
99. See id. at 907 (defining a general news conference as a conference
“where all media generally are informed of the mayor’s intention to hold a
news conference and all are free to attend”).
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general press conference.100 The court also recognized that,
while government officials have the First Amendment right to
criticize the press, there is a line:
[W]hen criticism transforms into an attempt to use the
powers of governmental office to intimidate or to discipline
the press or one of its members because of what appears in
print, a compelling governmental interest that cannot be
served by less restrictive means must be shown for such use
to meet Constitutional standards. No compelling
governmental interest has been shown or even claimed
here.101

In 1976, a Massachusetts district court granted a
temporary restraining order against city public officials when
they excluded a news station’s cameramen from accessing the
city council chamber and a press area designated for
cameramen, and then only allowed them access to the
spectator’s section, in violation of their First Amendment
rights.102 The court highlighted the distinction between a news
conference and a private interview:
Public officials need not furnish information, other than
public records, to any news agency. The opportunities to
cover official news sources must be the same for all
accredited news gatherers, however. All representatives of
news organizations must not only be given equal access, but
within reasonable limits, access with equal convenience to
official news sources.103

Although not absolute, this right “may not be
infringed . . . in the absence of a compelling government interest

100. See id. 907–08 (noting that the mayor denied the plaintiff, an
individual reporter, and his publication multiple times from attending press
conferences while other reporters were allowed).
101. Id. at 910.
102. See Westinghouse Broad. Co. v. Dukakis, 409 F. Supp. 895, 896–97
(D. Mass. 1976) (deciding in favor of the news station because a city
councilman had asked two cameramen to leave the council chamber while
allowing the same station’s reporter to remain).
103. Id. at 896.
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to the contrary.”104 The court found that the station was
“entitled to share the special facilities provided for other
stations, even though they are provided as a convenience.”105
The court also found that the city public officials had shown no
compelling government interest to overcome an interference
with the station’s rights under the First Amendment.106
In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Cuomo,107 the
Second Circuit articulated that, “once there is a public function,
public comment, and participation by some of the media, the
First Amendment requires equal access to all of the media or
the rights of the First Amendment would no longer be
tenable.”108 In that case, the Second Circuit held that “the First
Amendment rights of [the television network] ABC and of its
viewing public would be impaired by their exclusion from the
[mayoral] campaign activities” after the candidates denied ABC
access to broadcast live coverage of postelection activities at the
candidates’ headquarters.109 In support of its decision, the
Second Circuit explained that the candidates had opened the
door to the press having access to their campaign activities:
We think that once the press is invited, including the media
operating by means of instantaneous picture broadcast,
there is a dedication of those premises to public
communications use. . . . The issue is not whether the public
is or is not generally excluded, but whether the members of
the broadcast media are generally excluded. If choice were
104. Id. (citing Quad-City Cmty. News Serv., Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp.
8 (S.D. Iowa 1971); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Haw. 1974)).
105. Id. at 897.
106. Id.
107. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding that when there is a public function, public comment, or participation
by some media there is a First Amendment requires equal access by all of the
media).
108. Id. at 1083; see also, e.g., Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 762
F. Supp. 1558, 1573 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Regardless of whether the government
is constitutionally required to open the battlefield to the press as
representatives of the public, a question that this Court has declined to decide,
once the government does so it is bound to do so in a non-discriminatory
manner.”).
109. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 570 F.2d at 1083.
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allowed for discrimination in a public event of this
magnitude in the various media, then we reject the
contention that it is within the prerogative of a political
candidate. We rather think that the danger would be that
those of the media who are in opposition or who the
candidate thinks are not treating him fairly would be
excluded. And thus we think it is the public which would
lose.110

Each of these press access opinions, while illuminating in
some respects, are “vague regarding the degree of inclusiveness
needed to trigger a right of equal access.”111
In 1977, the D.C. Circuit in Sherrill v. Knight112 provided
more precise guidance regarding press access in the very context
of White House press conferences.113 The D.C. Circuit concluded
that because “the White House has voluntarily decided to
establish press facilities for correspondents who need to report
therefrom,” it has triggered the proviso that the government
“open[ed] its door” to “all bona fide Washington-based
journalists,” and thus could not arbitrarily exclude journalists
from White House press facilities.114 In Sherrill, the Secret
Service denied the Washington correspondent for The Nation a
press pass to White House press facilities.115 The White House
and Secret Service argued in support of their access denial:

110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. See Luke M. Milligan, Rethinking Press Rights of Equal Access, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1103, 1107 n. 10 (2008) (noting that these decisions were
based “on the factual context of the exclusion of the reporter: [G]eneral news
conferences open to all media” (quoting Snyder v. Ringgold, 40 F. Supp. 2d
714, 717 (D. Md. 1999))).
112. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding
that denial of press access to the White House briefing room must be based on
a compelling governmental interest and is subject to other procedural
requirements).
113. See id. at 126 (detailing facts of the case including the denial of a
White House press pass to a reporter).
114. Id. at 129.
115. See id. at 126 (“The denial resulted solely from the determination of
the Secret Service, after investigating Mr. Sherrill, that he not be issued the
pass.”).
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Because the public has no right of access to the White House,
and because the right of access due the press generally is no
greater than that due the general public, denial of a White
House press pass is violative of the [F]irst [A]mendment only
if it is based upon the content of the journalist’s speech or
otherwise discriminates against a class of protected
speech.116

The D.C. Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument, noting
that, regardless of an individual reporter’s more restricted
access into the “greater” White House itself, White House press
facilities specifically “hav[e] been made publicly available as a
source of information” for journalists and “are perceived as
being
open
to
all
bona
fide
Washington-based
journalists . . . .”117 Because the White House has “voluntarily
decided to establish press facilities for correspondents who need
to report therefrom,” it was of no moment that press facilities
merely ensured a right to access of the press and not the
“general public.”118 Thus, the White House “opened the door” to
equal press access to certain of its facilities by opening the
facilities to the press in general.119 The Sherrill court
demarcated this general rule by noting that the President
retained the discretion to grant exclusive interviews or briefings
with selected journalists without the risk of opening the door to
having to grant exclusive interviews to all journalists.120
In finding that “[t]he protection afforded newsgathering
under the [F]irst [A]mendment guarantee of freedom of the
press . . . requires that this access not be denied arbitrarily or
116. Id. at 129.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.; see also Milligan, supra note 111, at 1107 (balancing barring “bad”
forms of selective access (press conferences) and “good” forms of selective
access (exclusive interviews) by producing a test that says “[a]n excluded
reporter enjoys a presumptive right of access whenever such access is already
generally inclusive of the press”).
120. See Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129 (“Nor is the discretion of the President
to grant interviews or briefings with selected journalists challenged. It would
certainly be unreasonable to suggest that because the President allows
interviews with some bona fide journalists, he must give this opportunity to
all.”).
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for less than compelling reasons,”121 the D.C. Circuit in its
decision took into account not only the interests of members of
the press and the publications for which they write but also the
interests of the “public at large.”122 If the government arbitrarily
restricts a journalist from “newsgathering” and “sources of
information,” the corollary to the journalist’s restriction is that
the government will also be restricting the “public at large” from
accessing a variety of “sources of information.”123 Further, while
the Sherrill court acknowledged the unique security concerns at
the White House, it found that merely informing the reporter
the Secret Service’s basis for the exclusion of the journalist—
“reasons of security”—without more, was insufficient.124 The
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that a showing of “potential risk to
the physical security of the President or his family,” in
conjunction with a “publish[ed] or otherwise ma[de] publicly
known . . .[,] explicit and meaningful standard governing denial
of White House press passes,” may constitute a compelling
interest to permit denial of press access to particular
reporters.125

121. Id. (citing Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829–35 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
681 (1972); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)).
122. See id. at 129–30 (“Not only newsmen and the publications for which
they write, but also the public at large have an interest protected by the first
amendment in assuring that restrictions on newsgathering be no
more arduous than necessary, and that individual newsmen not be arbitrarily
excluded from sources of information.” (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).
123. See id. (“[R]ight conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection”
(quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943))).
124. See id. at 130 (“Merely informing . . . rejected applicants that
rejection was for ‘reasons of security’ does not inform the public or other
potential applicants of the basis for exclusion of journalists from White House
press facilities. Moreover, we think that the phrase ‘reasons of security’ is
unnecessarily vague . . . .”).
125. See id. 130–31 (“This standard is sufficiently circumspect so as to
allow the Secret Service, exercising expert judgment which frequently must
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But what happens in a situation where the government’s
provided rationale may not be supported by a compelling reason
or where the government arbitrarily denies the reporter access?
In other words, what happens if the government’s stated
rationale is pretextual? The Sherrill court’s procedural
guidelines allow for the opportunity to rebut the government’s
decision to deny access:
We think that notice to the unsuccessful applicant of the
factual bases for denial with an opportunity to rebut is a
minimum prerequisite for ensuring that the denial is indeed
in furtherance of Presidential protection, rather than based
on arbitrary or less than compelling reasons. The
requirement of a final statement of denial and the reasons
therefor is necessary in order to assure that the agency has
neither taken additional, undisclosed information into
account, nor responded irrationally to matters put forward
by way of rebuttal or explanation.126

Subsequent to Sherrill, three network television
companies—ABC, NBC, and CBS—alleged that the White
House Press Office’s decision to exclude their representatives
“from participating in the press pool coverage of . . . White
House events, while continuing to allow pool participation by
representatives of other forms of news media” interfered with
the First Amendment right of access of the press to cover news
events and right of the public to receive information about the
activities and operation of the government.127 After an extensive
be subjective in nature, considerable leeway in denying press passes for
security reasons.”).
126. Id. at 131 (citations omitted).
127. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238,
1241–42 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The district court provided a definition of a “press
pool” as:
The obligation of those in the pool is to share their material with
those media representatives not included. Traditionally, a very
small pool, called a “tight pool” has been used when it has been
deemed necessary to restrict media attendance to no more than
thirteen persons (which includes one television crew of five persons;
[for instance,] the television representation in the tight pool has
been rotated among CBS, ABC, and NBC). Also, a so-called
“expanded pool” consisting of more than thirteen media
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review of Supreme Court opinions regarding the press’s right of
access, in addition to the Sherrill opinion, a Georgia district
court confirmed “that the First Amendment include[s] a right of
access to news or information concerning the operations and
activities of government.”128 This right, however, is “subject to
limiting considerations such as confidentiality, security, orderly
process, spatial limitation, and doubtless many others.”129
The court applied Justice Brennan’s test in Richmond
Newspapers to decide whether the White House violated the
station’s rights of access.130 First, the court noted that “there is
a history of pool coverage of presidential activities going back
through several past Administrations in which television news
representatives took part”; in other words, “there is an enduring
and vital tradition of public entree (through the press as agents)
to the presidential activities covered by press pool.”131 Second,
“pool coverage of presidential activities is important to the
President,” because a “public awareness and understanding of
the President’s behavior facilitates his effectiveness as
President,” which is “necessary for a determination by the
public of the adequacy of the President’s performance.”132 Thus,
television stations “have a limited right of access to White House

representatives, has been used when some numerical limitation has
been deemed necessary, but where more than thirteen persons can
be accommodated. Both the “tight pool” and the “expanded pool”
include representatives of the print and the television media.
Id. at 1240–41.
128. See, e.g., id. at 1242–44 (reviewing Richmond Newspapers,
Branzburg, Pell, Saxbe and Sherrill to identify the right of access); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 684 (1972), Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834–35 (1974), Saxbe v.
Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 869 (1974), Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
129. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. at 1244.
130. See id. (applying the Richmond Newspapers’ two principles that take
into account “the information sought and the opposing interests invaded”
(quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588 (1980))).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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pool coverage in their capacity as representatives of the public
and on their own behalf as members of the press.”133
After the district court found that television stations had a
limited right of access, it balanced “the interest served by the
sought-for newsgathering activity against the interest served by
the governmental restraint.”134 The court recognized the public’s
interest in having the television stations present in White
House pool coverage outweighed the interest served by the
governmental restraint, because as “the importance of the
particular news event or news setting increases,” “the
importance of conveying the fullest information possible [also]
increases,” and here, presidential activities are considered of the
utmost importance.135 The government failed to present “any
reason such as considerations of security or space limitation.”136
Thus, the court held that “the total exclusion of television
representatives from White House pool coverage denie[d] the
public and the press their limited right of access, guaranteed by
the First Amendment.”137
In Stevens v. New York Racing Association,138 a New York
district court found that the New York Racing Association
(NYRA) violated the First Amendment rights of a horse-racing
newspaper’s publisher when it barred him from taking
photographs at the NYRA’s racing tracks that were otherwise
open to the press.139 The court looked at whether the NYRA
restricted the publisher’s access based upon the content of the
133. Id. at 1245.
134. Id. (citing Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Haw. 1974)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 175–77 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding that a nonprofit racing association deprived a publisher of its
First Amendment rights when it restricted the publisher’s photographer from
taking photographs in certain areas of the racing track, while other press
members were allowed access to take photographs).
139. See id. at 177 (“[D]efendant is enjoined . . . from prohibiting
plaintiff . . . from
carrying
a
camera
into
the
paddock
areas . . . unless . . . plaintiff’s conduct in the paddock area unreasonably
annoys patrons . . . or interferes with the business conducted in the
paddock.”).
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publication or whether the restriction “serve[s] a legitimate
government purpose” and “outweigh[s] the systemic benefits
inherent in unrestricted (or lesser-restricted) access.”140 The
court found that the NYRA violated the publisher’s First
Amendment rights, because the publisher put forth sufficient
facts to show the NYRA’s restriction was content-based, and in
fact, likely “pretextual.”141 The rationale behind the
restriction—that the publication’s “coverage made [the plaintiff]
appear bigger than the [NYRA]’s events”—is “based on
disapproval of the contents of [the newspaper].”142 Moreover, the
fact that the NYRA’s rationale appeared pretextual, due to its
changing, inconsistent rationales as to why it restricted the
publisher’s access, bolstered the court’s decision that the
NYRA’s restriction was content-based.143 But even if the
restriction was not content-based, the court concluded that the
publisher had demonstrated sufficient facts that the restriction
did not “serve a legitimate government objective or that the
benefits derived from the restriction [were] fewer than the harm
that it cause[d],” because no one had actually complained about
the publisher and there was no indication that the publisher’s
activities “interfered with the normal activities carried on” at
the racing track.144 In sum, “the costs of the restriction in terms
of loss of editorial freedom and newsgathering, as well as a
possible reduction in the readership’s enjoyment, outweigh[ed]
any benefits which defendant [could have been] expected to
derive from the restriction.”145

140. Id. at 175.
141. See id. at 175–76 (“The conclusion that defendant’s decision was
content-based is bolstered by the fact that defendant’s explanation that the
limitation was imposed because of plaintiff’s conduct appears pretextual.”).
142. Id. at 175.
143. See id. at 175–76 (explaining how the rationale for restricting the
plaintiff’s access appeared “pretextual” because of the defendants’
“inconsistencies” pre-deposition and post-deposition, revealing that no one had
actually complained about the plaintiff’s behavior).
144. Id. at 176–77.
145. Id. at 177.
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The D.C. Circuit distinguished its prior Sherrill decision in
JB Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Defense,146 where media and
veterans’ organizations challenged a Department of Defense
policy barring all members of the press and public from access
to the mortuary of deceased soldiers at a military base.147 The
D.C. Circuit found that that the Department of Defense’s access
policy did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment right of
access because “military bases do not share the tradition of
openness on which the Court relied in striking down restrictions
on access to criminal court proceedings,” a reference to the
Richmond Newspapers/Press-Enterprise “logic and experience”
test.148 The D.C. Circuit also found that the Department of
Defense applied its access policy “in a uniform
fashion . . . regardless of their views on war or the United States
military.”149 Thus, the access policy did not violate the First
Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of the press, because the
base had not “opened the door” to press access.150
In 2002, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed Sherrill in Getty
Images News Service Corp. v. Department of Defense,151
recognizing that when the Department of Defense (DoD) grants
146. See JB Pictures, Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., 86 F.3d 236, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding that the regulation at issue did not violate the First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech and the press).
147. See id. at 238 (“JB Pictures[,] . . . several other media and veterans’
organizations and individual reporters challenged the . . . access policy on
First Amendment grounds, arguing that precluding access to the war
dead . . . while permitting access to other activities . . . constituted
impermissible ‘viewpoint discrimination.’”).
148. Id. at 240.
149. Id. at 239.
150. See id. (noting that merely because the policy allowed the public and
press “substantial” access to certain areas of the base, and sometimes for
particular occasions, this did not “open the door” to “complete” access).
Compare id., with Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–35 (1974) (finding that
the prison had not “opened the door” even though it made some areas of the
prison available to the press and public).
151. See Getty Images News Servs. Corp. v. Dept. of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d
112, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the media organization “is likely to
succeed on the claim that, at some point in time, published criteria and a
process for obtaining relevant information must be in place to govern media
access to ongoing detention activities at Guantanamo Bay”).
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certain media organizations limited access to Guantanamo Bay,
while restricting others, the First Amendment requires that the
DoD “must not only have some criteria to guide its
determinations, but must have a reasonable way of assessing
whether the criteria are met.”152 Even though the D.C. Circuit
remained cognizant of the heightened deference associated with
military affairs, “equal access claims by the press warrant
careful judicial scrutiny,” regardless of the activity at issue.153
The government should “publish . . . the criteria used in . . . [its]
selection process and provide a way for applicant media
organizations to submit information demonstrating that they
satisfy the criteria,” an ode to the D.C. Circuit’s imposed
procedural guidelines in Sherrill.154 This process, in turn, would
enable the government “to conduct a reasoned evaluation of
media organizations under clear governing criteria,” which
would ensure that the government does not arbitrarily deny
access to the media.155
A California district court in Telemundo of L.A. v. City of
156
L.A.
considered whether a ceremony commemorating the
Mexican War of Independence constituted a public or nonpublic
forum in order to determine the extent to which a television
broadcast station’s First Amendment rights may be exercised.157
The court’s consideration of the characterization of the forum is
152. Friedman, supra note 55, at 283 (quoting Getty Images, 193 F. Supp.
at 121).
153. See Getty Images, 193 F. Supp. at 119 (noting that even though
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is not a public forum, equal access claims under
the First Amendment require careful judicial scrutiny).
154. Id. at 121 (citing Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir.
1977)).
155. See id. at 120–21 (expressing concern that the DoD’s method of
selecting which media organizations are placed on flights to Guantanamo Bay
arbitrarily or unreasonably denies access to the Naval Station) (citing Sherrill,
569 F.2d at 130).
156. See Telemundo of L.A. v. City of Los Angeles, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095,
1103 (C.D. Ca. 2003) (holding that “the City’s restrictions on Telemundo’s
access to the official ceremony are unreasonable[,]” violating Telemundo’s
First Amendment rights).
157. See id. at 1101 (considering “the character of the location where the
expressive activity will occur” to begin its First Amendment claim analysis).
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similar to the “experience” factor in the “logic and experience”
test—whether there is an “enduring and vital tradition” of
public access to the forum.”158 The court recognized that
government property becomes a public forum if the property has
“traditionally been held in the trust for the use of the public” or
has been “opened for expressive activity by part or all of the
public.”159 On the other hand, “nonpublic forums include
property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication.”160 If the property is a public forum, the
government may impose “time, place, or manner” restrictions,
provided that “the restrictions are content-neutral” and
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest”
and “leave open ample alternative channels for communication
of the information.”161 The court found that a ceremony
commemorating the Mexican War of Independence constituted
a public forum, because the ceremony had taken place on
government property for at least three years, “transforming
publicly owned property into a public forum for expressive
activity.”162 Next, the court considered whether the city’s
restrictions on the station’s broadcast of the ceremony were
reasonable, in light of the fact that the city granted another
station access to the ceremony.163 After the station initiated the
lawsuit, the city argued that the restrictions on the station were
necessary for public safety reasons.164 The court found that the
city’s restrictions on the station’s access to the ceremony were
158. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
159. Telemundo of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1101–02.
160. Id. at 1102.
161. See id. (“If government property has by law or tradition been given
status as a public forum, a state’s right to limit protected expressive activity
is sharply circumscribed.”).
162. Id.
163. See id. at 1102–03 (“[The city] initially decided that KMEX’s cameras
should be granted access to the official ceremony while Telemundo should be
required to use a pool feed.”).
164. See id. at 1103 (“However, now that the City has made the decision
[to not grant access to Telemundo], it argues that the restrictions on
Telemundo are required for public safety reasons pursuant to Los Angeles Fire
Department Standard Policies and Procedures for outdoor concert events.”).
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unreasonable, because the city put forth no evidence that it had
any meaningful or legitimate public safety concerns, such as
occupancy restrictions, and thus the restrictions appeared
pretextual.165 Lastly, the court inquired into whether the station
had shown a reasonable possibility of irreparable injury.166 The
court rejected the city’s argument that, because the station to
which the city had granted access would provide a pool feed to
the plaintiff’s station, it would not be irreparably harmed.167 The
First Amendment encompasses the right to certain creative,
discretionary choices, such as deciding “what to film, what to
emphasize, and what images to relay to viewers.”168 Further, the
city had not shown that the pooling was in fact necessary.169
In Raycom National, Inc. v. Campbell,170 an Ohio district
court found that a mayor had not violated a broadcast station’s
First Amendment rights when the mayor ordered city officials
to stop giving the station interviews.171 The court discussed
what would have had to occur in order for the station’s First
Amendment rights to have been violated.172 If, for example, a
broadcast station’s reporters were “prohibited from attending
press conferences,” or if the government were to bar “access to
information generally available to other members of the media,”
165. See id. (“In reviewing the declaration of L.A. Fire Department
Inspector Benjamin Flores, the Court did not find that he concluded that
occupancy restrictions preclude Telemundo’s cameras or trucks.”).
166. See id. (analyzing the question of irreparable harm in the preliminary
injunction test after determining that the station had “established a
substantial likelihood of success on its First Amendment claim”).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Raycom Nat’l, Inc. v. Campbell, 361 F. Supp. 2d 679, 688 (N.D.
Ohio 2004) (holding that the station was not entitled to a temporary
restraining order because it is unlikely to prevail on its claim that the mayor’s
action violated the station’s First Amendment rights).
171. See id. at 681 (explaining that the mayor “issued an ‘edict’ prohibiting
City officials and employees from speaking with or providing information to
WOIO reporters” with the exception of answering requests for formal records).
172. See id. at 683–84 (noting that what plaintiff was alleging—that the
station received “interviews or statements off-the-record”—did not amount to
a successful First Amendment claim, and an injunction would give the station
“preferential status”).

“OPENING THE DOOR” TO PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES 871

then a reporter may have a successful First Amendment
claim.173 If, on the other hand, a government official merely
denied exclusive interviews or other special requests that went
beyond information generally available to other members of the
media, First Amendment issues would not be triggered.174
In Nicholas v. City of New York,175 a New York district court
stated that, when a restriction on the press appears to be
content-based, it is the proper “subject of additional factual
development” for a court to inquire into “the motivation
underlying the limitations on news-gathering . . . especially
where . . . there are allegations that the reasons provided for the
restriction are ‘pretextual.’”176 The plaintiff, a photojournalist,
alleged that his First Amendment rights were violated when the
New York Police Department (NYPD) revoked his press pass in
retaliation for the content of his speech.177 He claimed that the
NYPD discriminated against him based on “his work and the
NYPD’s prior experiences with him,” when the NYPD
“knowingly permitted two photojournalists to take pictures of
the scene from ‘behind police lines,’ while the rest of
photojournalists were corralled in the ‘press pen,’ out of sight
and earshot.”178 The court looked at the circumstances
surrounding Nicholas’s exclusion and the NYPD’s comments
about Nicholas, and inferred that the NYPD “targeted him
because they did not believe him to be a ‘team player,’ and they
had experienced previous run-ins with him.”179 The court

173. Id. at 683.
174. Id. at 684.
175. See Nicholas v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-9592, 2017 WL 766905,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017) (holding that the plaintiff’s First Amendment
allegation, whether characterized as either viewpoint-based discrimination or
arbitrary, supports a theory of his exclusion from news-gathering).
176. Id. at *6 (citing Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 175
(E.D.N.Y. 1987)).
177. See id. at *1 (“Nicholas alleges that Defendants violated his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by revoking his New York Police Department
(“NYPD”) press credential without due process and in retaliation for the
content of his speech.”).
178. Id. at *5–6.
179. Id. at *6.
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accepted Nicholas’s argument that the NYPD arbitrarily denied
him access:
[A]rbitrary restrictions on news-gatherers may run afoul of
the First Amendment, unless Defendants can explain the
need, because the First Amendment protects the public
against the government’s arbitrary interference with access
to important information, including the diversity of media
outlets covering an event. The nature and potential
arbitrariness of the limit on some news-gatherers but not
others is an additional area for more factual development.180

In 2018, a South Dakota district court in Danielson v.
Huether,181 like the court in Raycom National, found that the
plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to show that city
government officials violated his First Amendment rights when
they stopped sending him notifications of press releases and
press conferences normally sent to the media, denied him access
to special locations for newsgathering, and stopped answering
his questions.182 In response to the first two allegations, the
court found that he had not cited any cases holding that he had
a right to receive notices of press releases and press conferences,
nor had he shown “that these special locations were otherwise
generally available to the media.”183 In regard to the third
allegation, the court found that “government officials have no
First Amendment obligations to respond to a particular
reporter.”184 Although the court did not rule in favor of the
plaintiff, it suggested what would trigger First Amendment
issues: “Of course, denying a member of the press access to
certain types of information otherwise made available for public
180. Id. (citations omitted).
181. See Danielson v. Huether, No. 4:18-CV-04039, 2018 WL 6681768, at
*10 (D.S.D. Dec. 19, 2018) (holding that the plaintiff’s “allegations that the
Defendants failed to treat him like other members of the media are insufficient
to allege a violation of the First Amendment”).
182. See id. at *10. (“Unlike the plaintiffs in Cuomo [or]
Sherrill, . . . Danielson does not claim that government officials excluded him
from press conferences or press facilities that were generally open to the public
or the media.”).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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dissemination could present potential First Amendment
problems.”185
III. Analysis of the Press’s Right of Access
A. When and On What Grounds Can the President Restrict the
Press’s Right of Access?: A Framework
The aforementioned case law dealing with the press’s right
of access to government property or certain forums sets forth a
number of factors to consider in deciding whether the
government has “opened the door” to press access and on what
grounds the government can limit that access.186 This case law
provides workable principles for analyzing whether President
Trump and his Administration have restrained the press’s right
of access in violation of the First Amendment.
Once the President and the Administration have “opened
the door” to press access generally, they must provide the press
equal access.187 They can neither exclude a reporter arbitrarily
or for less than compelling reasons,188 nor exclude based on the
viewpoint of that reporter or of the affiliated media outlet.189

185. See id. at *10 (distinguishing from Cuomo and Sherrill, noting that
plaintiff merely claims “that the City told him that he could no longer receive
notifications of press releases and conferences normally sent to the
media . . . and that the City has denied him access to special locations”).
186. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Media, supra note 91, at
1019 (acknowledging that “the media’s right to gather information is far from
straightforward”).
187. See, e.g., Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[W]e
are presented with a situation where the White House has voluntarily decided
to establish press facilities for correspondents who need to report therefrom.
These press facilities are perceived as being open to all bona fide
Washington-based journalists . . . .”).
188. See, e.g., id. (“White House press facilities having been made publicly
available as a source of information for newsmen, the protection afforded
newsgathering under the [F]irst [A]mendment guarantee of freedom of the
press, requires that this access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than
compelling reasons.”) (citations omitted).
189. See, e.g., id. at 129 (“[A]rbitrary or content-based criteria for press
pass issuance are prohibited under the [F]irst [A]mendment . . . .”).
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In order to determine whether the Administration has
“opened the door” of the forum to press access, both the
Richmond Newspapers’ two-part “logic and experience” test190
and Cuomo’s equal access test191 provide guidance. Where there
is a history of press access, access should generally not be
denied.192 This general rule, however, does not preclude the
President from granting an individual interview with a specific
reporter without being required to grant individual interviews
with other reporters.193
Once a court has determined the Administration has
“opened the door” to the press generally, it should then inquire
whether the government has denied particular reporters access
arbitrarily, for less than compelling reasons, or based on the
viewpoint of that reporter or of the affiliated media outlet. The
court is to engage in careful judicial scrutiny in considering the
press access issue.194 Such careful judicial scrutiny requires the
Administration to put forth compelling reasons for restricting
members of the press that do not include discriminatory or

190. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (asking first, whether there is an “enduring and vital
tradition” of public access to the forum, and second, “whether access to a
particular government process is important in terms of that very process”); see
also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (referring to the
Richmond Newspapers test as “tests of experience and logic”); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“[T]he institutional
value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and experience.”).
191. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977)
(“[O]nce there is a public function, public comment, and participation by some
of the media, the First Amendment requires equal access to all of the media
or the rights of the First Amendment would no longer be tenable.”).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Nor
is the discretion of the President to grant interviews or briefings with selected
journalists challenged. It would certainly be unreasonable to suggest that
because the President allows interviews with some bona fide journalists, he
must give this opportunity to all.”).
194. See, e.g., Getty Images News Servs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp.
2d 112, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[E]qual access claims by the press warrant
careful judicial scrutiny.”); Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 130 (noting that the
government must provide “meaningful” rationales to allow for “meaningful
judicial review of decisions to deny press passes”).
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arbitrary exclusions or pretextual rationales.195 Further, even
when an Administration invokes a concern related to the special
nature of the presidency and the White House, like
“confidentiality, security, orderly process, [or] spatial
limitation,”196 as the reason for restricting press access, the
court should still ask whether the restriction serves a
compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to
serve the Administration’s interest.197 Thus, the court should be
able to inquire into an Administration’s motive to determine if
the Administration has a legitimate purpose for restricting the
press’s access.198

195. See, e.g., Nicholas v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-9592, 2017 WL
766905, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017) (“[T]he motivation underlying the
limitations on news-gathering is properly the subject of additional factual
development, especially where, as here, there are allegations that the reasons
provided for the restriction are pretextual.”); Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 665
F. Supp. 164, 175–76 E.D.N.Y. 1987) (“The conclusion that defendant’s
decision was content-based is bolstered by the fact that defendant’s
explanation that the limitation was imposed because of plaintiff’s conduct
appears pretextual.”).
196. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244
(N.D. Ga. 1981).
197. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)
(recognizing that the government can only overcome the right of access to
criminal trials if it can show “that the denial is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”).
198. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982) (“[T]he First
Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by
not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the
restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected
expression.”); Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 175 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (explaining that a limitation on the press, even if not content-based,
must “serve a legitimate governmental purpose, must be rationally related to
the accomplishment of that purpose, and must outweigh the systemic benefits
inherent in unrestricted (or lesser-restricted) access”); see also Developments
in the Law—The Law of Media, supra note 91, at 1029–31 (suggesting a
motive-based inquiry focusing on “why, not whether, the doors have been shut
on particular reporter,” which “would likely eliminate the most obvious and
egregious forms of viewpoint discrimination,” while also allowing government
officials to “defend themselves by showing that the access denial was based on
legitimate motives”).
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B. Applying the Framework to the Three Trump-Press Incidents
The outset of this Note summarized three incidents in
which President Trump and his Administration excluded
members of the press, arguably in violation of the First
Amendment.199 This section will apply the framework for
analyzing the press’s right of access suggested above to those
three incidents.200
1. Incident #1: The Gaggle Exclusion
The first incident involved the White House’s exclusion of
certain news organizations from an off-camera gaggle with the
Press Secretary while allowing others to attend, hours after
President Trump had denounced the press as “the enemy of the
American People” due to his frustration with a New York Times
article detailing contacts between Trump and Russian
intelligence officials.201 The White House had pre-determined
the media outlets that would be allowed into the gaggle, which
many characterized as a notable break from protocol in the
White House.202
The first question is whether the White House “opened the
door” to press access. White House press conferences in general
have been a “regular, if not always successful, feature of
presidential–press relationships” since President Woodrow
Wilson’s Administration, a mark of a long history and an
enduring tradition.203 Further, press conferences in the White
House play an important role in establishing a forum for the
press that in turn provides a connection between daily White
House activities and the general public, who lack hard passes.
Thus, as to press conferences, the two-prong “experience and
199. See discussion supra Part I.A.
200. See discussion supra Part III.A.
201. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
202. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
203. See Martha Joynt Kumar, Source Material: Presidential Press
Conferences: The Importance and Evolution of an Enduring Forum, 35
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 166, 168 (2005) (“The development of this forum came
about through the efforts of the president and his staff, but the commitment
to such sessions is testimony to the press’s continuing interest in the
presidency no matter who serves as president or what he says or does.”).
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logic” analysis in Richmond Newspapers would support a First
Amendment right of access the White House must recognize.
But does access to press pools or gaggles enjoy the same
right of access? White House press pass holders historically
have enjoyed access to gaggles. Moreover, press access to
gaggles play a particularly significant role, taking the place of
typical daily press conferences.
The second question is whether the government has denied
a reporter arbitrarily, for less than compelling reasons, or based
on the viewpoint of the reporter or of the affiliated media outlet.
The White House’s motivation to exclude specific media outlets
arguably was not compelling because the White House did not
justify its action with logistical concerns, such as spatial
constraints.204 The exclusion may also have been arbitrary
because the Press Secretary’s explanation did not include any
meaningful reason for the exclusion:205 “We had a pool and then
we expanded it. We added some folks to come cover it. We do
what we can to be accessible . . . . I think we have gone above
and beyond when it comes to accessibility and openness . . . .”206
Further, an argument can be made from the timing that the
decision to exclude specific media outlets was motivated by the
viewpoints of those particular outlets. The exclusion of outlets,
including that of the New York Times, occurred within a few
hours of Trump denouncing the press “as the enemy of the
American people” in reaction to the Times article.207 To
overcome the government’s heavy burden in First Amendment
cases, the White House would have had to put forth a legitimate,
compelling interest for excluding the media outlets from the
gaggle.208 It did not appear to do so.

204. See Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238,
1244 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (specifying “confidentiality, security, orderly process, [or]
spatial limitation” as possible compelling concerns).
205. See cases cited supra note 194.
206. Vitali, supra note 1.
207. Vitali, supra note 6.
208. See cases cited supra notes 197–198.
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2. Incident #2: The Press Conference Exclusion
The second incident involved the White House banning a
CNN reporter from attending an open press event with
President Trump after she asked him questions about his
former lawyer Michael Cohen and Russian president Vladmir
Putin at an earlier photo op at the White House.209
The first question—whether the Administration has
“opened the door” to the press generally—is easily satisfied here
because the event in the Rose Garden was characterized as
open.210 The second question—whether the Administration
denied a reporter arbitrarily, for less than compelling reasons,
or based on the viewpoint of that reporter or of the affiliated
media outlet—requires looking at the Administration’s
rationale for excluding the reporter.211 After the incident, Press
Secretary Sarah Sanders said that the reporter had “shouted
questions and refused to leave despite repeatedly being asked to
do so . . . . [We] made clear that any other journalist from her
network could attend.”212 Unless the reporter was acting out in
a way that triggered legitimate concerns regarding security or
other published guidelines restricting the type of questioning in
which the reporter engaged, the White House may have
excluded the reporter arbitrarily or for less than compelling
reasons. More likely, the White House excluded the reporter
based on the content of the reporter’s questions given the close
temporal connection between the reporter’s questions about
touchy news stories involving the President’s professional
relationships and the subsequent exclusion.
3. Incident #3: The Press Pass Suspension
The third incident involved the suspension of CNN reporter
Jim Acosta’s press pass because of an alleged, and later
discredited, altercation between Acosta and a White House

209.
210.
211.
212.

See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
See cases cited supra note 194.
McLausand, supra note 12.
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intern.213 After the incident, Press Secretary Sanders issued a
statement that indicated a shift from the White House’s original
rationale for suspending Acosta’s license—that Acosta placed
his hands on the White House intern—to the rationale that the
White House must “run an orderly and fair press conference”
and cannot allow a member of the press “to monopolize the
floor.”214 A district court judge later granted CNN”s temporary
restraining order and ordered the Administration to reinstate
Acosta’s hard pass, but did not base the decision on First
Amendment grounds.215
The first question—whether the Administration had
“opened the door” to the press—is satisfied here because the
press conference took place in the long-established White House
Press Room. Cuomo’s equal access test to determine whether
the government has “opened the door” provides guidance:
“[O]nce there is a public function, public comment, and
participation by some of the media, the First Amendment
requires equal access to all of the media or the rights of the First
Amendment would no longer be tenable.”216 First, the White
House press facilities provide a “public function,” because they
allow members of the press from a variety of media outlets
access to White House press conferences, which in turn allows
those media outlets to provide a buffet of perspectives to the
interested public. Second, without this access, “public
comment”—whether interpreted as the press’s ability to
comment on and critique the government, or the public’s ability
to make well-informed opinions after the press has provided it
with information concerning the operations and activities of
government—would be impossible. Third, the fact that
Washington-based reporters and White House correspondents
have hard passes, as Acosta has, to have more-or-less
unrestricted, albeit regulated, access to White House press
conferences establishes “participation by some of the media.”

213.
214.
215.
216.

See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Under the second part of the analysis, there are two
perspectives as to whether the White House revoked Acosta’s
hard pass arbitrarily, for less than compelling reasons, or based
upon his viewpoint. On one hand, the White House may have
arbitrarily excluded Acosta because the alleged physical
altercation between Acosta and the White House intern was
later disproven.217 Thus, it follows that the Press Secretary’s
statement after the revocation of Acosta’s hard pass indicating
that the “White House cannot run an orderly and fair press
conference when a reporter acts this way, which is neither
appropriate nor professional,” is unsupported.218 On the other
hand, the White House may have excluded Acosta based on its
opinion of CNN because during the incident in the press
conference, President Trump said, “When you report fake news,
which CNN does, a lot, you are the enemy of the people.”219
Moreover, the White House may have excluded Acosta based on
the content of Acosta’s questions due to the almost immediate
temporal connection between Acosta’s questions about touchy
subjects and Trump’s request to have the microphone taken
away from Acosta.220 In any case, the White House’s shifting,
inconsistent rationales point to the likelihood that the exclusion
was pretextual, a factor present in the 2017 case Nicholas.221
IV. Conclusion
This Note proposes a framework for courts to apply in
future right of access cases where the President and his or her
Administration exclude or restrict the access of specific
reporters to press-briefing events. In light of the three events
involving the Trump Administration described in this Note, one
of which resulted in a lawsuit, it is not impracticable to expect
forthcoming similar incidents as well. In the first few months of
2019, President Trump tweeted that “THE RIGGED AND
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra text accompanying note 27.
See supra text accompanying note 29.
See supra text accompanying note 24.
See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
See supra text accompanying note 176.
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CORRUPT MEDIA IS THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE!”;222
that the New York Times is “a true ENEMY OF THE
PEOPLE!”;223 and the Washington Post is “Fake News” after
these newspapers published news stories that he did not like.224
These remarks would provide support for a reporter’s claim that
the President has violated the reporter’s First Amendment right
of access because his comments are consistent with an
unconstitutional motive to exclude “unfriendly” members of the
press.225
The White House has “opened the door” to the press because
there is an enduring tradition of press members being granted
passes to the White House to gain access to daily press
conferences, whether planned or impromptu. This established
access is invaluable as it is through the press that the general
public becomes informed on the actions and policies of the
current Administration. The case law discussed in this Note
indicates that the White House must possess a compelling
government interest for press access limitations that is
legitimate and viewpoint neutral, and that the limitations must
be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Anything less is an
impermissible “closing” of the door and frustration of the
political values the First Amendment is designed to protect.

222. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 17, 2019, 7:56
AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status
/1097117499336855553?lang=en (last visited Feb. 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc
/5TN4-68UC].
223. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2019, 8:49
AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status
/1098218016255414272?lang=en (last visited Feb. 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc
/DLW4-5BME].
224. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2019, 7:44
AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status
/1098201685518893056?lang=en (last visited Feb. 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc
/EEE5-QL3N].
225. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Media, supra note 91, at
1029 (suggesting a motive-based inquiry focusing on “why, not whether, the
doors have been shut on particular reporter”).

